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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

AMANDA HARVEY,

: APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

: Case No.

BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,

:

Defendant/Respondent.

970153
960904572

Priority No. 15

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
the pour-over order from the Utah Supreme Court dated May 14, 1997.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did

the

trial

court

err

in determining

that

Amanda

Harvey's right to claim underinsured motorist benefits from Bear
River Mutual Insurance Company was fixed as of the date of her
injury on August 14, 1993?
This is an issue of law which is reviewed for correctness
without difference to the findings of the trial court.

Utah Dept.

of Environmental Quality v. Wind River Petroleum, 881 P.2d
(Utah 1994 .

869

The issues were preserved in the trial court by way of
motion for summary judgment and memorandum in opposition thereto.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND CASE LAW
1.

31A-22-305(10) (6) , U.C.A. prior to amendment.

2.

31A-22-3 05(10)(c)(i)(B),

U.C.A.,

which

became

effective May 1, 1995.
3.

Carlucci v. Utah State Industrial Commission, 725

P.2d 1335 (Utah 1986).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 14, 1993, Amanda Harvey was a passenger in an
automobile being driven by Kyle Schwartz.

Mr. Schwartz, at the

south gate of Hill Air Force Base, made a left turn in front of an
on-coming

jeep.

The jeep collided with the Schwartz vehicle.

Amanda Harvey was very seriously injured.
Allstate insured Kyle Schwartz.

In January, 1996, Judge

Rodney Page approved a settlement in Amanda's favor against Mr.
Schwartz and Allstate for $110,000
$10,000 underinsured money).

($100,000 liability money and

The settlement documents were then

signed with actual payment of the settlement money taking place in
February, 1996.
Amanda's parents and family members, including Amanda,
were insured through Bear River Mutual Insurance Company for an
additional

$10,000

in underinsured

demanded cf Bear River.

coverage.

Than

money

was

It refused payment saying thaL because the
2

accident occurred before the enactment of 31A-22-305(10)(c)(i)(B),
Amanda was not entitled to receive this money from it.
On March 6, 1997, Judge Frank Noel entered his order
agreeing

that Amanda was not entitled

benefits from Bear River.
19, 1997.

to recover

underinsured

A Notice of Appeal was filed on March

It is from this ruling that Amanda Harvey now appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

On August 14, 1993 Amanda Harvey was a passenger in

an automobile driven by Kyle Schwartz.
2.
accident,

He was insured by Allstate.

Amanda Harvey was seriously injured in an automobile

resulting

in

permanent

injuries

and

necessitating

extensive medical treatment.
3.

Allstate paid $100,000 to settle the liability of

Kyle Schwartz

for the claims of Amanda Harvey and $10,000

in

underinsured motorist coverage.
4.

On January 2, 1996, Judge Rodney Page approved the

settlement of Amanda Harvey's claim against Allstate's insured Kyle
Schwartz.

At that time, settlement documents were signed.
5.

Allstate's settlement money was actually paid out in

February, 1996.
6.

At the time of Amanda's injury on August 14, 1993 her

parents were insured by Bear River Mutual Insurance Company.
7.

The Harvey's insurance contract provided $10,000 in

underinsured coverage to family members.
3

8.
contract

However, the Bear River Mutual Insurance Company

specifically

excluded

coverage

of

insurance

for

unaerinsured purposes until identified conditions precedent were
met.
There is no coverage until the limits of
liability of all bodily injury liability bonds
or policies that apply have been used up by
payment of judgments or settlements to other
persons.
9.

In January, 1996, those conditions precedent having

been satisfied, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company was asked to
pay Amanda's underinsured claims against it.
10.

It refused payment.

At the time of the accident which injured Amanda in

August, 1993, U.C.A., Section 31A-22-305(10) (6) prohibited stacking
of underinsured coverage.
11.
effect.

On May 1, 1995, Section 31A-22-305(10) (c) (i) (B) took

It changed the law in this state to specifically permit an

injured family member to recover underinsured benefits from the
family policy, in addition to recovering benefits under the policy
covering

the vehicle

the person

occupied

at

the

time

of

the

accident.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Bear

River

Mutual

Insurance

Company's

contract

of

insurance regarding underinsured coverage, specifically excluded
coverage

until

("There

is

no

coverage

until.

.

.")

in

this

instance, Allstate had actually paid the judgment or settlement to
4

Amanda.

Settlement and payment of Amanda's claim against Allstate

and its insured Kyle Schwartz did not occur until January and
February, 1996.

Therefore, under the Bear River Mutual Insurance

Company's contract, until conditions precedent were met,

Amanda

had no underinsured coverage at all until January and February,
1996,

at

which

established

or

time

the

created.

coverage
Because

and

her

claim

was

Bear River Mutual

first

Insurance

Company's coverage was not established or created until January or
February, 1996, Amanda is entitled to have her right to claim this
coverage governed by the law in existence at the time of the
establishment or creation of her right to make her claim.

Carlucci

v. Utah State Industrial Commission, 725 P.2d 1335

(Utah 1986) .

Therefore, U.C.A.,

governs

Section

31A-22-305(10)(c)(i)(B)

her

right to make a claim.
ARGUMENT
In

the

granting

of

defendant's

motion

for

summary

judgment, the trial court reasoned that Amanda's right to make a
claim

for underinsured

coverage was fixed by the date of the

accident (August 14, 1993); U.C.A., Section 31A-22-305 (10) (c) (i) (B)
could not be applied retroactively before May 1, 1995/ therefore,
because Amanda's injury occurred before May 1, 1995, she could not
recover underinsured benefits from Bear River Mutual

Insurance

Company.
The error in this reasoning is that, by contract, Amanda
5

had no underinsured coverage through Bear River, nor a right to
claim these benefits

(There is no coverage until

. . .) until

January or February, 1996, when the claim against Allstate was
settled and paid.
Section

Therefore, there is no need to apply U.C.A.,

31A-22-305(10)(c)(i)(B)

retroactively

because

her

underinsured claim did not arise, was not created or established
until January or February, 1996.
The

longstanding

rule

of

insurance

contract

interpretation in this state is that where an insurance policy is
ambiguous, the language of the policy-contract must be construed
against the drafting insurance company and in favor of payment of
benefits.
P.2d 519

United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. V. Sandt, 854
(Utah 1993).

Bear River argues that Amanda's right to

claim underinsured benefits vested or matured as of the date of the
accident, therefore, the pre-May,
prohibiting stacking governs.

1995 version of

the

statute

However, the policy of insurance

does not say 'Amanda's rights to coverage vest or mature at the
time of the accident'.

To the contrary, the policy says she has

"no coverage" until, in this instance, Allstate has actually paid
Amanda

the

Schwartz.

judgment

or

settlement

against

its

insured

Kyle

Thus, the question of coverage under the contract

language is subject to two differing interpretations, one of which
permits a recovery and one which does not.

Applying the Utah

insurance rule, the interpretation in favor of coverage must be the
6

holding in the case.
In
Amanda's

addition,

right

the

trial

to underinsurance

court

erred

benefits

instance, by the date of the accident.

was

in

ruling

fixed,

in

that
this

Our Supreme Court's ruling

in Carlucci v. Utah State Industrial Commission, 725 P.2d

1335

(Utah 1986) mandates a holding that Amanda's claim did not arise
until Allstate's settlement money was actually paid to her.
In Carlucci, Lester Carlucci was killed in an industrial
accident on October 7, 1983.
children.

His

employer

He was survived by his wife and three
did

not

have

worker's

compensation

insurance and was in bankruptcy proceedings at the time of his
death.

In March, 1984, some five months after Mr. Carlucci's

death, the Default Indemnity Fund was created pursuant to U.C.A.,
Section 35-1-107.
Fund.

Mrs. Carlucci sought death benefits from that

The Industrial Commission and Default Indemnity Fund had

denied her claim saying that it arose before the creation of the
Fund so she could not avail herself of its benefits.

While stating

the general rule that the law establishing substantive rights and
liabilities when a cause of action arises, and not a subsequently
enacted statute governs the resolution of a dispute, the Supreme
Court said the critical issue was whether Ms. Carlucci's claim
arose before or after the enactment of the statute.
It was the holding of the court that "because
the Default Indemnity Fund is not liable until
such tirr.e as the employer becomes unable co
7

discharge
his
workmen's
compensation
liability.
. . Thus, a worker, or his
dependents, in case of his death, cannot sue
the Fund cefore it is clear that the primary
obligor, tne employer, cannot pay. It follows
that a dependent's right against the Indemnity
Fund does not accrue until the primary
obligor's inability to pay his liability is
established.
In other words, the right to recover does not accrue
until the conditions precedent have been met.

Applying the same

reasoning here, it is clear from the ruling in Carlucci that Amanda
Harvey's right to claim underinsured benefits from Bear River, by
contract, did not accrue until the condition precedent, namely the
payment of a judgment or settlement from Allstate to her, which
occurred in January and February, 1996, actually took place.
actual

payment

of

the

settlement

money

in

February,

The
1996

establishes then the date that her right to make such a claim
accrued

(i.e. the conditions precedent were satisfied). Thus it

follows that her claim is then governed by the law m
that time.

effect at

U.C.A. Section 31A-22-305(10)(c)(l)(B) had become law

8 months earlier.

It was the law in effect at the time her right

to claim underinsured benefits from Bear River accrued

Therefore,

it must be applied and she is entitled to claim the benefits the
law gives her against: Bear River.
CONCLUSION
Amanda Harvey's claim against Bear River for underinsured

8

benefits

did

not

arise

until

January

and

February,

1996.

Therefore, she is entitled to receive underinsured benefits from
Bear River and the trial court's ruling must be reversed.
Dated this

^7^?

day of > ^ ^ ^ c ^ t ^ 1 , 1997
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN

ppellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I

hereby

certify

that

on

lis
th:

2>7

day

of

September, 1997, I mailed two true and correct copies of the above
and foregoing Appellant's Brief, postage prepaid, to:
Roger Bullock
STRONG Sc HANNI
600 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM

RECEIVED FES 2 5 19

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Stephen E. Harvey, individually, and
as general guardian of Amanda Harvey,
a minor,
Plaintiffs,

MINUTE ENTRY

CASE NO: 960904572 PI
vs.
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company,
Defendant.

The court reviewed defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement, together with the
memos filed in connection with the motion and rules as follows:
The court is of the opinion the parties' rights and obligations under the insurance contract
are fixed at a date no later than the date of the accident, and accordingly for plaintiff to prevail
the statutory amendment would have to be applied retroactively. Under the facts of this case
the amendment in question cannot be applied retroactively inasmuch as substantive rights of the
parties are involved and the language of the amendment does not expressly provide for
retroactivity.
Accordingly, defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted
Counsel for defendant is to prepare an appropriate order
Dated this ?ll

day of February, 1997.
C-

Frank G Noel
District Court Jud^e

PAGE TWO

HARVEY V. BEAR RIVER

MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry,
postage prepaid, to the following this r^?U

day of February, 1997.

James R. Hasenyager
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN
Attorney for Plaintiff
2408 Van Buren Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
Roger H. Bullock
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
600 Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

V/IA«.<.,-..- (xy.^y'bto)..
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C A R L U C C I v. UTAH STATE INDUS. COM'N
Cite a* 725 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1986)

fendants Davis and Dyer are limited partners (although they are designated as genera) partners in this lawsuit). All parties
arc residents of Utah County, and the principal asset of the limited p a r t n e r s h i p is real
property located in Kane County.
Dispute arose over the m a n a g e m e n t of
the partnership and, in F e b r u a r y 1988, Davis ami Dyer filed a complaint in Utah
County
In that action, Davis and Dyer
sought an accounting, d a m a g e s , and dissolution of the limited partnership. In early
1985, Hatch filed a pro se complaint in
Kane County. Hatch alleged t h a t Davis
and Dyer had wrongfully attempted to sell
the Kane County property, and he sought,
inter alia, "[a]n injunction against further
usurpation by Defendants of the rights of
the Plaintiff to act as the General Partner
of [RK1 >(']." Davis and Dyer made a special appearance to contest venue and moved
to dismiss the action. This motion was
ultimately granted by the district court m
Kane County
11.2J On appeal, Hatch points out that
he included a quiet title cause of action in
his lawsuit. He a r g u e s that under U.C.A.,
1953, § 78-13-1, he is entitled to have the
lawsuit adjudicated in Kane County since
that is where the property is located. The
problem >vith Hatch's a r g u m e n t is that it is
undisputed that the property is owned by
the limited partnership KEDC, which is not
a plaintiff in the Kane County suit. 1
Therefore, the action is not b r o u g h t by one
who claims a legal interest in the real property
l i l ' A , 1953, § 7 8 - 4 0 - 1 . Moreover,
tins is not a dispute over the ownership of
the Kane County land, but a dispute between p a r t n e r s over their respective rights
and duties. Venue is therefore controlled
by U.C.A., 1953, § 78-13-7, which provides
generally that an action is to be tried "in
the county in which the cause of action
arises, or in the county in which any defendant resides at O* commencement of
the action " Since all parties to this lawsuit are residents of Utah County, the case

Utah

should be heard there. This is particularly
so since a similar lawsuit was already ongoing in Utah County between these same
parties a

in Ins . c p h biicf, Hatch slates. "We both
agree that i n k rests and should rest in the

The order of dismissal is therefore
firmed. Costs to Davis and Dyer

af-

Vickie CARLUCCI, Plaintiff,
v.
UTAH STATE I N D U S T R I A L COM MISSIGN and Defuult I n d e m n i t y
Fund, Defendants.
No. 20386.
Supreme Court of Utah
Sept. 12, 1986.

Widow of deceased worker s o u g h t review of denial of benefits from the Default
Industrial Fund.
The S u p r e m e Court,
Stewart, J., held that claim of worker or his
dependents against the Fund does not arise
until the employer's inability to pay is established and it is the law in effect at that
time that determines the rights of the
worker or his dependents
Reversed and remanded.

1. S t a t u t e s «=*265, 266
Law establishing s u b s t a n t i v e rights
and liabilities when cause of action arises,
and not a subsequently enacted s t a t u t e ,
governs resolution of dispute.
2. Statutes <S=>267(2)
Statutes which are procedural only and
do not create, alter, or destroy substantive
rights may be applied to causes of action
2.

725 P A C I F I C R E P O R T E R , 2d S K R I F S

that have accrued or are pending at the
time the s t a t u t e is enacted.
3. Workers' Compensation
«=»(M
S t a t u t e creating the Default Indemnity
Fund cannot apply to cases in which cause
of action arose before effective date of
s t a t u t e . U.C.A.1953, 35-1-107.
I. W o r k e r s ' C o m p e n s a t i o n <£=»!057
Worker or his dependents cannot sue
Default Indemnity Fund before it is clear that
primary obligor, the employer, cannot pay
and dependents' right against Default Indemnity Fund does not accrue until primary obligor's inability to pay liability is
established and it is the law in effect at
t h a t time that determines the rights of the
workers or his dependents.
U.C.A. 1953,
35-1-107(1).

See Ulan R Civ 1* 13(a) loi i c q u u c m e n t s of
filing a compulsoiy c o u n t e r c l a i m

comes insolvent, appoints or has appointed a receiver, or otherwise does not have
sufficient funds, insurance, s u r e t i e s , or
other security In cover w o r k e r s ' compensation liabilities under this c h a p t e r
If It
becomes necessary to pay benefits, the
fund will be liable for all obligations of
the employer a.s set forth in C h a p t e r s 1
and li. Title 35
Lester Carlucci was killed in an industrial accident in the course of his e m p l o y m e n t
with Pour-A-Yard, Inc. on October 7, 1983.
He is survived by his wife, Vickie Carlucci,
and their three children. Pour-A-Yard carried no workmen's compensation insurance
at the time of his death and was in a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding
The
case was converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding February 23, 1984

5. W o r k e r s ' C o m p e n s a t i o n <£=>64
Widow of worker who died prior to
effective date of act creating Default Indemnity Fund would be entitled to compensation benefits from the fund if the employer did not become unable to discharge its
w o r k m a n s ' compensation liability until after
the effective date of the Fund.
U.C.A.
1953, 35-1-107(1).

The issue on appeal is whether Mrs Carlucci may recover death benefits for her
and her children from the Default Indemnity Fund even though her husband died
before the Fund was established. The Industrial Commission denied her recovery
from the Fund on the g r o u n d that the
Indemnity Fund could not be held to apply
to accidents occurring before the effective
date of the s t a t u t e creating the fund

Arthur F. Sandack, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff

Section 35-1-107 became law March 29,
1984, some five months after Mr Carlucci's
death. The Commission and the Fund argue that the plaintiff's rights a r e governed
by the law in effect at the time of the
worker's death, when the c a u s e of action
arose. Mrs. Carlucci a r g u e s t h a t since the
s t a t u t e is remedial in n a t u r e , it should be
construed broadly to give her a remedy.

David 1. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen , Ralph L.
Finlayson, Salt Lake City, for defendants.
STEWART, Justice:
In 1984, the Utah l e g i s l a t u r e created the
Default Indemnity Fund to pay workers, or
their dependents, workmen's compensation
benefits when their employers are unable
to pay. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-107(1) (Repl.
Vol. 4B, 1974 ed., Supp.1985), 1 which became effective March 29, 1984, s t a t e s that
the Fund is
for the purpose of paying and assuring,
to persons entitled to, workers' compensation benefits when an employer beI.

I.

Utah

1335

Section J i - I - I ( ) 7 was a m e n d e d by the l.cgislu
line effective July 1, 1986. The most significant
i.hange in lei ins of this appeal is that the name
of the I'und wa.s changed to "Unlimited Em

[1J The general rule is t h a t the law
establishing substantive rights and liabilities when a cause of action arises, and not
a subsequently enacted s t a t u t e , g o v e r n s
the resolution of the dispute. Brunyer
v.
Salt Lake County, 551 P 2d 521, 522 (Utah
I97(i); Shape t> Wasatch Electric Co. 546
P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 197b), Ok land
Conpioyeis IUIHI ' H<i .ui'.t liiss ia:»e <uo.se, was
appealed ami a i g u r d d i n i n g the time the I'und
was known ai llu Default liidcmnil> Fund, we
use thai n a m e in ihib opinion.

CARLUCCI v. UTAH STATE INDUS. COM'N

Utah

1337

1338

Utah
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CUe u« 723 P.2d 1335 (Utith I9H6)

struction
i'o t Industrial
Commission,
520 P 2 d 208, 21 (J (Utah 1974); In re Anthony, 71 Utah 501, 504, 267 P. 789, 790
(1928); Mercur Cold Mining & Milling Co.
v. Spry, 16 Utah 222, 229, 52 P. 382, 384
(1898). Sec also § 68-3-3, which states:
"No part of these revised s t a t u t e s is retroactive, unless expressly so declared."
( 2 | There are, however, exceptions to
the rule of nonretroactivity.
Statutes
which are procedural only and do not create, alter, or destroy substantive rights
may be applied to causes of action that
have accrued or are pending at the time the
s t a t u t e is enacted
In State
Department
of Social Services e Hiygs, 656 P.2d 998,
1000 (Utah 1 9 0 , we Mated:
[P]roceoural s t a t u t e s enacted s u b s e q u e n t
to the initiation of a suit which do not
enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or
contractual rights apph not only to future actions, but also to accrued and
pending ;U'UI,I..> as >vel!
See also Pilchtt
v State Department
of
Social Sen ices 663 p 2d 450, 455 (Utah
l9S.ii /•',-/. t /. ^liiigt /, Mil P L\i 144, 151
Utah !9',9). :", Hi, c ( 7<i/7i, 113 Utah 205,
213-14, 192 P 2 d 589, 593 (1948);
Industnil Commission
i Ayee, 56 Utah 63, 67-68,
189 P 4 14, 4 15 16 (1920), Houcojski
v
lacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 171, 104 P. 117, 119
1909)
[3J The s t a t u t e creating the Default Iniemmty Fund is not a procedural s t a t u t e ,
t establishes substantive law that creates
L new jural entity with certain rights and
iabihties and establishes a new cause of
iction for workers or their dependents who
mve been unable to collect their worknen's compensation benefits from employe s . Being substantive in nature, the statite cannot be held to apply to this case if
rtrs Carlucci's cause of action arose before
he effective date of the s t a t u t e , and if
here is no clear legislative indication that
he s t a t u t e should apply to cases pending
vhen it became effective Brunyer
v. Salt
Mke County, 551 P 2d ut 522; In re Iniraham's
Estate, 106 Utah 337, 340, 148
>.2d 340, 341 (1944). See also Pitcher v.
>tate Department
of Social Sermces, 663

P.2d at 455. There is no evidence of such
legislative intent.
The critical issue, therefore, is whether
Mrs, Carlucci's claim arose after the enactment of the statute. Mrs. Carlucci's claim
against Pour-A-Yard, Inc., for workmen's
compensation death benefits is separate
and different from the claim that her husband would have had, had he lived
Hall
ing v. Industrial
Commission,
71 Utah
112, 118, 263 P. 78, 80 (1927). Her cause of
action for death benefits arose, not at the
time of her husband's accident, but at the
time of his death, although in this case
both occurred the same day. We have
specifically held in the context of workmen's compensation law that it is the law
in force at the tune of the worker's death
that determines a dependent's
rights
against the employer under the workmen's
compensation laws Silver King
Coalition
Mines Co. v. Industrial
Commission,
2
Utah 2d 1, 4, 268 P.2d 689, 691 (1954). As
the Court suited in Silver King, "(aJ stat
ute is not made retroactive merely because
it d r a w s on antecedent facts for its operation." Id. at 6, 268 P.2d at 692. See also
Cox v. Hart, 260 U.S. 427, 434, 43 S.Ct
154, 156, 67 L.Ed. 332 (1922)
It was no
doubt this body of law that the Commission
relied on in denying Mrs. Carlucci's claim
against the Indemnity Fund
(4, 5J However, Mrs. Carlucci's cause of
action against the Indemnity Fund arose at
some time after the date of her husband's
death because the Default Indemnity Fund
is not liable until such time as the employerbecomes unable to discharge his workmen's
compensation liability. Section 35-1-107(1)
expressly states that liability arises when
"an employer becomes insolvent, has appointed a receiver, or otherwise does not
have sufficient funds, insurance, sureties,
or other security to cover worker's compensation liabilities under this chapter." Thus,
a worker, or his dependents, in case of his
death, cannot sue the Fund before it is
clear that the primary obligor, the employer, cannot pay. It follows that a depend-

ent's right against the Indemnity Fund
does not accrue until the primary obligor's
inability to pay his liability is established.
It is the law in effect at that time that
determines Mrs. Carlucci's rights.
Okland
Construction
Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 520 P.2d at 210.
The next critical question then is whether
Mrs. Carlucci's right to a remedy under
§ 35-1-107 accrued after that section became effective. That issue has not been
briefed by the parties to this appeal, and
we are not in a position to resolve the issue
given this record. For that reason we are
obliged to remand this case to the Commission to determine when the claim arose or
accrued.
Indeed, the Commission's own
rules governing when and how a claim may
be made against the Fund may make a
difference in the outcome. In any event,
the Commission, in ruling on the point,
should bear in mind the liberal construction
that should be accorded the workmen's
compensation laws, including the legislation establishing the Default Indemnity
Fund, or what now is the Uninsured Employer's Fund
We are aware that the Legislature did
not appropriate any monies with which to
fund the Indemnity Fund and that its funds
were to be built up from unclaimed worker's compensation death benefits. Accordingly, a claim might be made against a
"dry fund," as the Commission argued in
denying relief. But that clearly was a possibility the moment the Fund came into
existence. How such claims should be handled is not before us, but may, depending
on the Commission's ruling as to when
Mrs. Carlucci's claim arose, become pertinent. The existence of the bankruptcy proceedings and the date of the order of discharge may also be relevant to the Commission's determination.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
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Newly practicing dentist brought action appealing order o( Industrial Comrnis
sion which held that he had acquired all or
substantially all of asset.*, of former dentiM
and, therefore, that wage and benefit cost
experience of both dentists had to he considered jointly for purposes of determining
new dentist's unemployment compensation
payments
The Supreme Court. :;i«".'..ir!,
J., held that newly practicing dentist'.* ac
quisilion of 75"/< of former dentist's assets
did not involve "substantially all" asseLs of
former dentist
Reversed and remanded

L Taxation <^3I7.1
Provision of Employment Security Act,
setting out when employer who purchases
all or part of assets or business of another
employer must make contributions to unemployment compensation fund based in
whole or in part on previous employer's
contribution rate r a t h e r than solely on rate
successor employer would pay as a new
employer, was applicable when buyer acquired substantially all asseLs of business,
rather than when buyer acquired substantially all asseLs of business necessary to
carry on principal business activities of seller. U.C.A.1953, 35-4-7(c)(l)(C)
2. Taxation c-».'M7.l

HALL, C.J., and HOWE, DURHAM and
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.

"Acquire," as used in provision of Employment Security Act requiring employer

